



OISMUN 2025

# UNHRC

UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL

## Agenda

Addressing the Humanitarian Crisis  
stemming from the Yemeni Civil War

## Executive Board

Aanya Baxi,  
Naavya Dhanuka,  
Vihaan SM

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# LETTER FROM THE secretariat

Dear esteemed delegates,

As the fortunate secretariat of this year's OIS MS MUN, we are thrilled to welcome you all to this conference. We are looking forward to seeing diverse and energetic delegates on the day of the event, and hope that all of you will benefit from this conference.

As students passionate about global issues, you possess the power to go on and make concrete changes in the future. This conference is a platform that will enable you to inspire and influence others with your ideas, your voice, and your actions. We hope that you will be able to carry forward this zeal for problem solving into your lives and be able to contribute meaningfully to issues that matter in your communities.

Having been a part of this conference and its organising team numerous times over the years, we can assure you that this conference will be a transformative experience for each and every one of you. Just as each of us left the MUN brimming with opinions and excitement to enact these beliefs, so will you. We hope that you feel a part of this community as much as we did, and leave the conference feeling empowered and inspired, with a deepened commitment to creating positive change in the world.

We encourage you to engage in meaningful and respectful dialogue with one another, throughout the conference, to listen attentively to different viewpoints, and to seek common ground amidst differences in opinion. We urge you to push your limits and challenge yourself, and one another by thinking critically to solve problems on the spot. We would love to see a display of political understanding from each and every one of you, and hope that this conference will be an opportunity for you to not only learn from one another, but also to support and uplift one another as you navigate through the complexities of the world around us.

Thank you for choosing to be a part of this year's Model United Conference. We are excited to see the impact that you will make, both during and beyond this event. We look forward to seeing you there!

With warm regards,  
OIS MS MUN Secretariat.



# INTRODUCTION TO THE executive board

## Aanya Baxi

She walks to the stage. Her enemies shaken. Her allies in trepidation. The chairs in eager anticipation, and almost everyone in the room teetering, as she began to break the fog of silence with her voice. “Under the Sea just like Xi Jinping’s brain!” she exclaimed, thundering to the audience. The room stood in shock as they had witnessed her extraordinary humour. She was immediately nominated for 6 Oscars, 5 Grammys and 8 Emmys. It was at that moment the people in the audience knew, they were witnessing a MUN protege at work. From the most obscure allocations imaginable, to almost unwinnable awards. Tackling diplomacy, fiery dramatics and leadership, all at once. The person fitting this description? Aanya Baxi. As a chair, she shows insightful judgment and intellect, puts delegates through riveting, gratifying situations, and will (hopefully) display some of the most phenomenal chairing you’ll see. With the largest committee, she has equally large expectations from all of her delegates — well-thought out, factually backed speeches, confident dramatics and passionate MUNers. As one of her delegates in her committee, do not be frightened by her. Though ruthless as a delegate, as a chair, she will be your mentor, assisting you in any matters, both before, during and after the conference. She is more than excited to meet all her delegates, and hopes to give you a phenomenal MUN experience!

## Naavya Dhanuka

Meet Naavya Dhanuka, a fiercely opinionated and witty delegate, who is sure to captivate and amuse any executive board with her pop culture and asian food references. As someone who started her MUN journey at one of the largest conferences in India, HMUN, and has, since then, continued to stand out in every committee for her incredibly detailed research, inspiring confidence, and horrendous fake accents, having Naavya as your chair definitely ensures an unforgettable experience (though not necessarily in a good way). To get on her good side, (which is still quite the challenge, even for us), be sure to at least remotely acknowledge either Taylor Swift, Lando Norris, or all things Japanese, because aside from her obnoxiously obsessive study habits, they’re the only things she believes are worth her time. Nonetheless, anybody lucky enough to be a delegate in Naavya’s committee is in for a hilarious, enlightening, and exciting experience, as she will try her best to guide and entertain every single delegate, proving to be one of the best chairs you’ll ever have.



## Vihaan S.M.

Ah yes, Vihaan S.M. Where do I start? To begin with, his tendency to come up with some of the most moving and passionate speeches that a committee would see in any of its sessions, armed with his in depth research (a grand total of 4 pages), knowing the UN Charter like it's the back of his hand, and his witty insults to the incompetence of any country challenging his stance. He loves to poke holes (and reveal some existing ones) in other delegates' arguments using some points of information he travelled through 4 dimensions to acquire, and some (most\*) may even be annoyed at his tendency to regularly raise points of order on factual inaccuracies. However, even if you don't even know what these terms mean, don't be afraid, as Vihaan is one of the kindest, most helpful and enthusiastic chairs you will ever meet. Be it a question about what an MUN is, guidance for your research, procedural questions or anything else, he is always willing to lend a helping hand and never judges. On a side note, if you want to earn some brownie points from him, he could talk for hours on end about his love for Rush, playing the guitar, coding, or absolutely anything, because he'll have substance to talk about. So don't be afraid of the 6'1" (6'1.8", basically 6'2") appearance, as a committee with Vihaan will make any delegate, new or experienced, feel like they're right at home.



# LETTER FROM THE executive board

Dear Delegates,

Welcome to the United Nations Human Rights Council in MSMUN 2025! We, Aanya Baxi, Naavya Dhanuka and Vihaan SM, your Director and Assistant directors respectively, are honoured to direct this committee focused on addressing the humanitarian crisis stemming from the Yemeni civil war. Through this agenda, we will delve deeply into a multi-faceted and complex issue, examining different perspectives and participating in heated debates. As your executive board for UNHRC this year, we hope that this conference benefits you greatly, as this is a wonderful opportunity to improve your leadership, problem-solving, public speaking, and communication skills.

Your continuous engagement, unique solutions, and dedication to representing your nations are absolutely vital regarding the challenges faced by Yemeni civilians and others affected by this civil war. We, your executive board, assure you that you will be pushed out of your comfort zone in this conference by engaging in fruitful debate, effectively creating an equilibrium between dramatics, problem-solving and concrete data, as well as showing diplomacy by working with other member nations to come up with nuanced and creative solutions to support these communities in the future.

As your EB, we recommend that you stick by your country's foreign policy and avoid disregarding it no matter the circumstances, and to constantly defend the actions taken by your government, as that is your responsibility as the representative of your country. If you do end up deviating from your foreign policy, justification and reasoning are crucial.

We have created this study guide with the aim of giving you background information and a pathway around this complicated agenda, to act as your starting point. However, we highly encourage and would look favourably upon you going above and beyond, expanding your knowledge, using more reliable primary and secondary sources to gain the most knowledge possible about this agenda and your country's position in it, in order to have a fruitful debate. As the humanitarian crisis stemming from the Yemeni civil war becomes increasingly prevalent, it is in your hands as to how you choose to manage this situation in committee.

We hope you have an exceptional MUN experience here at MSMUN! Even if it's your first time, participate as much as possible, and we will ensure that you feel comfortable in committee. We look forward to meeting each of you and witnessing your exciting debate in committee!

Best regards,

Your Executive Board

Aanya Baxi, Naavya Dhanuka & Vihaan SM



# INTRODUCTION TO THE committee

The United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) was established in 2006 as an intergovernmental body within the United Nations system (International Justice Resource Center). Composed of 47 Member States, it is a forum that addresses violations of human rights and country situations, with the responsibility of strengthening the promotion and protection of human rights globally (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights). The council responds to human rights emergencies and recommends how to improve and implement human rights in those regions. The council does not have legally binding powers but UNHRC meetings can raise careful examination and mandate investigations (Reuters).

Between 2006 and 2023, the UNHRC has adopted 1,481 resolutions, established 60 Special Procedures mandates and held 90 sessions (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights). The UNHRC meets for a minimum of 10 weeks annually at the United Nations Office in Geneva, and discusses human rights issues and country-specific situations that require urgent attention (United Nations Women). Across the world, the UNHRC has made recommendations for and helped resolve multiple problems, including slavery, refugee crises and the breach of female human rights (United Nations).

The UNHRC conducts their work through a myriad of methods, which include special sessions, missions for investigation, and the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) process, which evaluates the human rights records of all the 193 United Nations member states. The United Nations Human Rights Council works alongside other bodies and agencies, such as the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), to improve their effectiveness and ensure helpful approaches to human rights issues.



# INTRODUCTION TO THE agenda

Amid today's seemingly modern and interconnected world -- severe humanitarian crises continue to unfold, devastating entire regions. Yemen stands as one of the most catastrophic examples of this, with over 21.6 million people—approximately two-thirds of the Yemeni population—requiring humanitarian assistance (UNOCHA) as of 2023. The conflict, rooted in political instability and exacerbated by regional and global interventions, has plunged Yemen into what the United Nations describes as the “world's largest humanitarian crisis” (UN in Yemen). As this war continues to rage on since its start in 2014 (USA for UNHCR), it has resulted in mass displacement, famine and collapsing of essential infrastructure creating inhumane circumstances for Yemen's innocents. The crisis has left millions vulnerable to disease, malnutrition, and violence (Council of Foreign Relations). Addressing this crisis is not only an obligation but a moral requirement for the international community to alleviate the suffering of millions and pave the way for sustainable peace and stability.

The Yemeni Civil War stems from complex political disagreements, primarily between the internationally recognized government led by Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi until 2022 (followed by Rashad al-Alimi 2022 onwards), and the armed Houthi movement, with involvement from external actors such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Iran (Council of Foreign Relations). The war began in 2014 when the capital of Yemen, Sanaa, already destabilized by the Arab Spring uprising that began in 2011, was overtaken by the Houthi rebel forces (Britannica). The roots of this crisis can also be traced to historical grievances, economic marginalization, and a legacy of autocratic rule, further complicating the circumstances (Springer). It has created an increasingly separated nation along sectarian (divisions between different religious or ideological groups), regional (divisions based on geographic areas), and tribal (divisions based on tribal affiliations) lines. The innocent civilian populations have borne the brunt of the war, with over 4.5 million internally displaced (IDPs - internally displaced persons) (IOM Yemen) and more than 400,000 deaths reported (Campaign against Arms Trade), including those caused by indirect factors such as hunger and disease (UNDP). Consequently, the war has crippled Yemen's economy, leading to mass unemployment and the collapse of basic services,



further exacerbating the humanitarian emergency. The situation has deteriorated to such an extent that, according to the World Food Programme, over 17 million Yemenis face acute food insecurity, with famine looming in several regions (WFP).

The humanitarian crisis in Yemen highlights blatant violations of fundamental rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) -- a document that has served as the base of the UNHRC, and ensured the rights of millions since its creation in 1948 but remain unattainable for the Yemeni population (Amnesty International). The key clauses addressed as outlined by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), include:

- Protection of Life and Security (articles 3, 5, 9)
- Access to Essential Services (articles 25, 26), Protection and Promotion of Identity and Culture (articles 27, 18)
- Meaningful Participation in Civic and Political Life (articles 19, 20, 21).

Bettering the situation in Yemen extends beyond physical recovery to encompass the rebuilding of infrastructure, the provision of psychological support, and the reintegration of displaced populations into society (WHO). With a lack of engagement with international humanitarian mechanisms, prolonged blockades, and interference with aid delivery, any current actions regarding the crisis have been hindered and proven to be extremely difficult (HRW). Additionally, systemic issues (corruption, fragmented governance, enduring sectarian divides) perpetuate instability and suffering. There is a lack of consideration of the principles of the UN Charter and UDHR which silence the voices of the most vulnerable, and create disastrous humanitarian circumstances.

As the humanitarian situation in Yemen worsens, the responsibility lies in the hands of this committee to enact meaningful change, uphold the mission of the UNHRC, and safeguard the basic rights and dignity of the Yemeni people.



# HISTORY AND CONTEXT BEHIND THE agenda



While this is a human rights committee and the focus remains on the humanitarian crisis at hand, as a delegate, it is vital to have a strong understanding of the origins of the conflict, as well as the development of the humanitarian crisis over time.

A timeline of key events leading to the humanitarian crisis stemming from the Yemeni civil war (reference – Arab Center Washington DC)

## Early Stages of Conflict

- **1990** → North and South Yemen unify under the head of state at the time, President Ali Abdullah Saleh.
- **1994** → Civil war erupts when southern Yemen seeks to secede but is crushed by Saleh's forces.

## Houthi Uprising and Al-Qaeda

- **2003-09** → Houthi rebels in northern Yemen protest the marginalization of the Zaydi Shia Muslim sect, engaging in multiple conflict with Saleh's forces.
- **2011** → Arab Spring protests weaken Saleh's government, allowing al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) to seize eastern territories.
- **2012** → Saleh steps down, and Abdrabbu Mansour Hadi becomes interim president as the AQAP continues to stage attacks.
- **2014** → Houthi Takeover of Sanaa The Houthis, supported by Saleh, seize Yemen's capital, Sanaa, demanding greater political power.





## Saudi-Led Intervention

- **March 2015** → Saudi Arabia leads a coalition against Houthi rebels, pushing them out of southern Yemen but creating a military deadlock. The war leads to widespread hunger and displacement.
- **October 2015** → The UN reports that Yemen's economy is in freefall, with 18.5 million people dependent on aid (UN Population Fund). The humanitarian crisis intensifies as the Saudi-led coalition imposes a blockade, exacerbating shortages of food and medicine.

## Escalation and Blockade

- **2016** → Airstrikes kill 15,000 civilians (CAAT), especially from coalition forces with UN reports indicating major infrastructure damage.
- **2017** → The Houthis fire missiles into Saudi Arabia, and violence continues to spread. AQAP gains influence in some regions.

## Hodeidah and Humanitarian Aid

- **2018** → The UN brokers a ceasefire over the port city of Hodeidah, crucial for humanitarian supplies. The deal stalls, and airstrikes intensify.
- **November 2018** → Widespread famine risks as nearly 20 million people depend on humanitarian aid.

## Famine and Civilian Impact

- **2019** → The humanitarian crisis worsens – numbers reach over 19 million Yemenis in need assistance, and 9 million facing hunger.
- **2019** → The UAE withdraws forces, but its allies (including separatists) continue fighting the government.

## COVID-19 and Stalemate

- **2020** → COVID-19 exacerbates an already dire situation, worsening the humanitarian crisis. No progress on a permanent ceasefire despite a brief truce.
- **Late 2020** → An attack on Aden airport kills dozens, further destabilizing the situation.



- **2021** → The Biden administration ends US support for the Saudi-led coalition. Houthis intensify their assault on the government's last stronghold, Marib, displacing millions.
- **April-May 2021** → The UN calls for a ceasefire, but tensions remain high. The conflict continues to displace millions, with over 80% of the population in need of humanitarian aid.

## Truce and Ongoing Violence

- **April 2022** → A two-month truce is brokered by the UN, though violence persists in some areas.
- **April 2022** → President Hadi transfers power to a new Presidential Leadership Council, with Saudi and UAE support.
- **May 2022** → The World Food Program warns that the war and economic collapse have left millions at risk of starvation.

## Shift in Diplomacy and AQAP Resurgence

- **2023** → A shift in diplomatic efforts, with Saudi Arabia and Iran restoring relations, paving the way for potential peace talks with the Houthis.
- **August 2023** → Saudi Arabia pledges \$1.2 billion in aid to Yemen's government, though aid distribution remains inconsistent.
- **November 2023** → The Houthis declare war on Israel and hijack an Israeli-linked cargo ship, drawing international attention and exacerbating regional instability.
- **December 2023** → In response to ongoing attacks in the Red Sea, the US initiates Operation Prosperity Guardian, a multinational military operation aimed at countering Houthi threats.
- **March 2024** → The Houthis continue attacking shipping routes, including in the Indian Ocean, as peace talks remain stalled. (more information provided in the current situation section)

The above timeline consists of some, but not all of the major events interconnected with the Yemeni humanitarian crisis, so please do extend your research further based on the above for a better understanding if you feel you require it.




# CURRENT situation

Even after nearly a decade of conflict since 2015, the national socioeconomic systems of Yemen still remain on the brink of total collapse.

In April 2022, the UN brokered a truce between the most prominent parties involved in this conflict. These included the Houthi forces, the Yemeni government, and a coalition led by Saudi Arabia. This truce between the warring parties temporarily eased the violence in a war that had devastated the country. During the six-month ceasefire, there was a significant decrease in airstrikes, major military offensives, and civilian casualties. However, the truce expired in October 2022 when the two parties failed to renew the agreement after accusing each other of hampering peace efforts. The UN Special Envoy for Yemen, Hans

Grundberg, had proposed an extension to build on the agreement, but the lack of mutual trust between the sides and ongoing hostility ended up in the breakdown of negotiations. Although the truce period saw the lowest levels of reported fatalities from political violence in Yemen since January 2015, it should not conceal the fact that political violence continued in Yemen even during the truce. According to the Armed Conflict

Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), there were over 200 reported deaths per month from organized political violence across Yemen between April and October 2022. Notably, civilian fatalities accounted for approximately 22% of these overall fatalities during the truce, which translates to around 1,300 total fatalities, with an estimated 35% attributed to conflicts between the Houthis and the internationally recognized government of Yemen.







Furthermore, in late 2022 and throughout 2023, Houthi forces increased their use of drone and missile strikes against Saudi Arabia and UAE resources, while the Saudi-led coalition conducted limited retaliatory airstrikes. One of these coordinated attacks by the Houthi rebels targeted oil refineries and energy infrastructure across Saudi territory. These attacks spanned from Asir to the Eastern Province, and even threatened the Formula 1 Grand Prix in Jeddah. In response to some of these attacks, the Saudi-led coalition launched retaliatory strikes against Houthi positions in Yemen

which resulted in at least 80 civilian deaths, including three children.

Yemen's economic crisis was exacerbated by these attacks, which disrupted the essential supply networks and oil exports. By 2023, Yemen's GDP was already projected to contract by 1.0%, following a 2.0% decrease in 2022. Moreover, The Internationally Recognized Government (IRG) reported a decline in fiscal revenues by over 30%, primarily due to decreased oil revenues and customs revenues from redirected imports to Houthi-controlled ports. This decline has resulted in cuts to essential public services such as healthcare, education, and infrastructure maintenance. In fact, access to basic utilities in Yemen remains critically low, with nearly 90% of the population lacking access to publicly supplied electricity. In areas like Aden, residents continue to face prolonged electricity blackouts of up to 16 hours per day, exacerbated by diesel shortages that affected electricity production. Furthermore, about 15.3 million people require support to access clean water and meet basic sanitation needs.

The Southern Transitional Council (STC) and other UAE-aligned militias have also clashed with other groups allegedly affiliated with the internationally recognised Yemeni government. Deep-seated disagreements among anti-Houthi forces are



highlighted by these disputes, especially in southern regions like Shabwa and Abyan, which make it more difficult to present a united front in peace talks. By enforcing strict government regulations and progressively silencing opposition voices within their borders, the Houthis solidified their hold over northern Yemen.




Consequently, in April 2023, Oman-mediated peace talks between Saudi and Houthi leaders resumed alongside UN mediation efforts. The first official Houthi visit to the Saudi capital since the start of the conflict, on September 14, 2023, produced little more than optimistic remarks, and measurable improvement continues to be elusive. One significant action taken towards peace was a week after the talks, when the Yemeni government and Houthi rebels freed 869 detainees during a three-day exchange period. Planes full of former detainees were flown between Sanaa, held by the Houthis, and Marib, a government-controlled city in the north.



Another action taken that month, was when China brokered discussions between Saudi Arabia and Iran, both of which had backed opposite parties in the Yemen crisis. The agreement to restore diplomatic relations between the two regional powers encouraged hopes of a mediation in Yemen. While the improvement in Saudi-Iran relations has reduced overt proxy activity, its impact on the ground remains limited because neither party has put pressure on its allies to make essential concessions.

Further complicating the landscape, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) continues to exploit the security vacuum in Yemen, launching attacks on government forces and local militias. They increased the number of attacks in Yemen, reaching the highest monthly level in May and June of this year. For instance, AQAP announced "Operation Arrows of Righteousness" in September 2023, targeting the Southern Transitional Council (STC) and its allies. This operation resulted in 53 operational claims by AQAP from September to March 2023, with 13 claims made in September alone.





Notably, one of the deadliest incidents occurred on September 6, 2023, when AQAP attacked a checkpoint in the Ahwar district, resulting in at least 27 fatalities, including both militants and soldiers. In fact, most of AQAP violence is directed at the Southern Transitional Council (STC) and STC-allied forces, with some of the most violent

attacks occurring during August 2023, when an explosion killed a military commander and three soldiers from the Security Belt Forces. This ongoing insurgency threatens to destabilize regions already weakened by years of war and diverts attention from broader peace-building efforts.

In the following month of September, a delegation of Houthi officials and Omani mediators visited Saudi Arabia for a five-day round of negotiations. This was the first official visit by Houthis to the country since 2014. The discussions included



reconstruction plans, a timeline for foreign troop withdrawal from Yemen, and the reopening of the Sanaa airport and ports controlled by the Houthis. Officials were optimistic, but once again no concrete agreement was drafted. Nevertheless, both parties have retained a relative truce since the UN-brokered agreement.

However, the Houthis once again entered intentional headlines when the group declared war on Israel after the October 7th attacks initiated by Hamas on Israel. The Iran-funded group, on November 19, hijacked an Israel-linked cargo ship in the Red Sea and held 25 crew members hostage. Since then, the Houthis have continued to attack ships in the Red Sea shipping route.



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In response to ongoing Houthi attacks against ships in the Red Sea, the US initiated Operation Prosperity Guardian along with a coalition of 20 other countries, some of which wanted to remain anonymous. Saudi Arabia is notably absent in the list of participants, with Bahrain being the only MENA country. At the end of the month, the UN Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen Hans Grundberg provided an update on peace talks. The office stated that there was progress in negotiations and that both parties, represented by the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) President Rashad al-Alimi and the Houthi chief negotiator Mohammed Abdul Salam, have agreed to a set of measures for a ceasefire. Saudi Arabia and Oman were cited as playing key roles in the progress, along with the UN Special Envoy.

Things once again took a turn for the worse in the new year when in January 2024, The Biden administration re-designated the Houthis as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT). The administration had de-listed the group in 2021 following a last-minute decision to list them by the Trump Administration just a month before.

The following month, Houthi leader Abdul Malik al-Houthi stated that the group will



further escalate its attacks on Red Sea shipping if “aggression against Gaza does not stop, along with the siege of the Palestinian people from whom they deny aid and medicine.” International support and aid funding for Yemen has decreased, and humanitarian aid deliveries to Yemen and other countries in need of assistance have been severely delayed. Saudi Arabia gave \$250 million in aid to the Yemeni government for civil servant salaries, the budget deficit, and other government expenses. This was part of the country’s plan, introduced in August 2023, to provide \$1.2 billion in aid to the Yemen government.



The conflicts continue to escalate in March when the Houthis claim their first attack on cargo ships in the Indian Ocean, further expanding their reach as they continue their attacks on shipping in the Red Sea. As of March 12, the Houthis have attacked both naval and commercial vessels in regional waters over 60 times. These attacks have only increased since US-led Operation Prosperity Guardian was launched in December 2023. A peace deal is at a standstill, with talks on pause as Houthi attacks generate international outrage. The Houthi group threatened Saudi Arabia that if it allowed US forces, specifically fighter jets, to use its territory and airspace for its Operation Prosperity Guardian, they would target it as well. Saudi Arabia has not become involved in the US-led coalition and has asked the US to show restraint when responding to Houthi attacks as Riyadh seeks to contain the aftermath from the Hamas-Israel war.



Furthermore, AQAP leader Khalid Batarfi additionally died in March month from unknown causes. In response, Saad bin Atef al-Awlaki was chosen as his successor. With new leadership and increasing instability and international focus on Yemen, experts predict a rise in AQAP recruitment and attacks.

Although the reduction in active violence in Yemen since the war has seen fewer civilian casualties and suffering across communities, the

situation remains fragile in the absence of a long-term political solution. Nearly 4.5 million people from Yemen are still internally displaced. Many of them have been displaced several times since 2015, placing Yemen in the top six internal displacement crises globally. Many internally displaced persons (also known as “IDPs”) in Yemen reside in flood-prone or dangerous areas,

where there is widespread food insecurity as well as a lack of water, healthcare, and sanitation facilities. The problem is particularly detrimental to women and children. More than three-quarters of Yemen’s displaced population are women and children, and at least 26% of displaced households are headed by women, with 20% of them under the age of 18. With widespread





inflation and little employment possibilities, two-thirds of the population, or 21.6 million Yemenis, can no longer afford basic foods and are at risk of malnutrition, gender-based abuse, exploitation, and early marriage. As a result, due to the heavy toll this conflict has taken on Yemini civilians, it has been regarded as one of the world's worst humanitarian crises by the USA for UNHCR.

As of 2024, the Yemen conflict has turned into a prolonged stalemate, with neither side able to establish substantial military or political successes. The absence of large-scale offensives has not resulted in peace, but instead a slow burning catastrophe marked by periodic bloodshed, economic collapse, and humanitarian suffering. It is the responsibility of this committee to assess Yemen's current state of deterioration and work towards developing long-term, sustainable and internationally inclusive solutions that would finally bring peace to this war-ridden country.



# INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT AND past action

## UNSC Resolution 2140, 2014:

Resolution 2140 was one of the first UN measures taken to prevent further aggravation of conflict in Yemen. It established sanctions on parties threatening Yemen's peace and stability, aiming to support the country's democratic transition and prevent actions that would further destabilize the country's already deteriorating political process. It stated that "all Member States shall, for an initial period of one year from the date of the adoption of this resolution,

freeze without delay all funds, other financial assets and economic resources which are on their territories" belonging to designated individuals. Moreover, a committee, called the 2140 Yemen Sanctions Committee, was formed to oversee the implementation of these sanctions, and further ensure the compliance of member states when it came to adhering to this resolution.



The documentation additionally reaffirmed support for the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) initiative and the outcomes of the National Dialogue Conference, both of which were intended to guide Yemen towards a more democratic structure of governance.

## UNSC Resolution 2216, 2015

This resolution directly adhered to the escalation in violence coming from the Houthi rebels, who had seized control of significant portions of Yemen, including the capital Sana'a, and enforced an armed embargo on this group. It demanded that "the Houthis immediately and unconditionally end violence, withdraw their forces from areas they have seized, including the capital Sana'a, and relinquish all additional arms seized from military and security institutions". This action was implemented in hopes to restore order in the country, and facilitate a return to political negotiations amongst member states and parties involved in the conflict.



## Operation Decisive Storm, March 26, 2015

March 26, 2015 was when Saudi Arabia led a coalition of Arab States and launched Operation Decisive Storm, which was aimed towards eliminating the threat posed by the Houthi rebels towards the millions in Yemen already bearing the brunt of the harsh civil war. It further intended to restore the internationally recognized



government of President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi. This operation has since conducted over 20,000 air strikes and raids on Houthi targets in Yemen, with one third also hitting non-military sites. The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights reported a total of 17,062 civilian casualties since this time, with an estimate of 10,471 of these casualties being a direct result of the Saudi induced airstrikes.

## US action taken since 2015

Since the start of Saudi Arabia's participation in this devastating civil war, the US has been its biggest supporter from the P5, providing logistical and intelligence support in hopes to not only aid one of their most prominent allies but also to in some sense prevent the harm being inflicted upon Yemeni civilians. They have consistently shown their support for the UN-recognized government of President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi by providing substantial military aid and logistical assistance, with the intended goal of countering the Houthi rebels and preserving Saudi Arabia's territorial integrity against potential threats in Yemen. The U.S. has also engaged in mid-air refueling operations for Saudi aircrafts and offered targeting assistance for airstrikes against Houthi positions. This coalition's airstrikes have led to excessive civilian casualties and widespread destruction of infrastructure. However, with the Biden Administration gaining power in the early 2020's, the US shifted towards a more peaceful approach by providing more than \$3.4 billion in humanitarian aid to alleviate the suffering of the people of Yemen since the crisis began in 2015.

## UK and France Involvement since 2015

Both the UK and France, as strong allies of the US and Saudi Arabia, have supplied an extensive amount of arms to the Saudi-led coalition including the UAE and other Arab States. The UK has supplied an estimated £23 billion (approximately \$29 billion) worth of arms to Saudi Arabia, alongside the €8 billion (approximately \$9.5 billion)





worth of military equipment France has supplied too. These supplies range from aircrafts, missiles, armored vehicles and other military supplies. There have also been allegations that British-supplied arms were allegedly used in attacks that resulted in civilian casualties. Consequently, in 2019 the UK Court of Appeal ruled that arms sales to Saudi Arabia were unlawful, leading to a temporary, albeit redundant, suspension of new export licenses.

### **Iranian support for Houthi group since 2015**

Iran's relationship with the Houthis dates back to the early 2000s, though it was indeed further escalated after the seizure of Yemen's capital, Sana'a, by the Houthis in September 2014. According to numerous sources, the Iranian military started providing support to the Houthis as early as 2009, when their initial conflicts occurred with the government of Yemen. In 2014, when the Houthis continued to gain in power, it was more evident that Iran provided them with weaponry and military training. Specifically, Iran has been accused of providing weapons such as ballistic missiles and drones to the Houthi rebel group. As a result, a UN panel of experts in 2018 concluded that this country was in non-compliance with the arms embargo implemented during the early days of the conflict. Aside from just military support, Iranian military advisors are said to have trained Houthi forces, increasing their ability to operate against Saudi forces and expand their operational capacity. Overall, this sustained support has enabled the Houthis to carry out sophisticated military operations against both Yemeni government forces and Saudi-led coalition forces.

### **Stockholder Agreement and UNSC Resolution 2415, December 2018**

This agreement was brokered by UN Special Envoy Martin Griffiths, and largely focused on implementing a ceasefire in Hodeidah and implementing numerous prisoner exchanges between warring parties. Resolution 2415 endorsed this agreement and authorized the deployment of the UN monitoring team in Yemen. The resolution demanded that "all parties fully respect the ceasefire in Hudaydah governorate".



## Response to Houthi attacks in Red Sea, 2024

Amongst the first most significant actions taken towards ceasing the Houthi attacks was the UNSC Resolution 2722 which demanded an immediate end to Houthi attacks on merchant and commercial vessels in the Red Sea. Furthermore, the US launched a multinational naval operation at the end of 2023,



called Operation Prosperity Guardian. This US-led initiative aimed to protect commercial shipping in the Red Sea from Houthi attacks. Another US preventive measure was implemented in January of 2024 along with the UK, where both countries conducted strikes on Houthi military targets in Yemen, in response to continued Houthi attacks on shipping. Lastly, UNSC Resolution 2739 extended the mandate of the UN Special Envoy for Yemen and reiterated the demand for the Houthis to cease attacks on vessels in the Red Sea.

The international response to Yemen's crisis has been a combination of political, humanitarian, and military interventions. However, the lack of effective diplomatic strategies and persistent commitment to this crisis has hindered any plausible solutions, ensuring that Yemen is stuck in an endless cycle of conflict.



# CASE studies

## Study I: The Women's Rights Situation

Today, the women of Yemen suffer severe violations of their guaranteed rights. Yemen was marked a 9/100 on Freedom House's freedom scale, which indicates a lack of even some fundamental freedoms. The Group of Eminent International and Regional Experts on Yemen found major violations of international humanitarian law and human rights in Yemen by all parties, the Houthis and Coalition forces.

Freedom of expression of women and women's rights activists has taken a toll in STC, Houthi and official government territory. The Houthis have been known for their crackdown on human and gender rights activists, lawyers, journalists and others, often using arbitrary detention and even torture, violence and violent threats. Freedom of



expression, another right guaranteed under the ICCPR, was infringed upon due to journalists' knowledge or attempts to expose human rights malpractice or simply expressing opposition to their ideology. An unnamed female journalist, mentioned in the report of the Group of Eminent International and Regional Experts on Yemen, had reported having to write under a fake name due to the fear of being identified as someone writing pieces against the Houthi government.



Reports also point out that the Houthis interrogated at least 10 women's rights activists, and repeatedly told them that women's rights would be against tradition. They have also used threats such as the detention of the activists' children if they refused to cooperate with the Houthis.



The Houthis used a group known as the Zainabiyat, similar to the Faraja in Iran, which is responsible for enforcing laws against women. The group regularly conducts kidnappings, threats, interrogation, intimidation and other acts against women if they fail to cooperate with the government. Propaganda is also a major tool of the Houthis for marginalising women, by censoring secular or pro-women's rights work and imposing extreme ideologies on the public.

Freedom of movement of women has also contracted greatly, since the Houthis introduced rules that ban women leaving their house, governorate, or even country without a male chaperone (usually their spouse). However, even in official government controlled territories, the Personal Status Act of 1992 stipulates that women can lose their right to spousal maintenance if they were to leave their house without their husband's consent or a "legitimate reason." Freedom of movement is also constrained in territories controlled by Al-Islah and even AQAP.




The women's rights situation in Yemen remains a matter of grave concern, and if it continues to deteriorate, more innocent civilians will be caught in the cross hairs of war and face injustice. Though not a "humanitarian" problem in pure terms, the human rights situation as a result of the humanitarian crisis only exacerbates the instability in Yemen. Past efforts have been made by the OHCHR to improve accountability for human rights or international law violations in Yemen through their Country Office, opened in Aden in 2012. However, the existence of multiple parties trying to exert control over Yemeni territory and claim it as their own, hampers efforts from reaching their full scale, as efforts taken in Yemeni government controlled territory has an isolated impact that does not improve the situation in STC or Houthi territories.



## Study 2: Food insecurity in civilian populations

Food insecurity in Yemen remains a pressing issue that requires priority attention. According to the United Nations Development Programme, over 24 million Yemenis are food insecure, of which over 16 million are past IPC (full form : Integrated Food Security Phase Classification) Phase 3, which is a marker of food insecurity. When IPC



Phase 3 is declared, it signifies that over 20% of the population suffers from extreme food shortages, over 30% suffer from acute malnutrition and 2 in every 1,000 people die from food shortages on a daily basis (Euro Med Monitor). The IPC’s report on the same also highlights that between October 2024 and

February 2025, approximately 1.1 million people will be in Phase 4 food insecurity (Emergency), 3.5 million in Phase 3 (Crisis), 3.1 million in Phase 2(Stressed), and 2.5 million in relatively high amounts of security.

Clean water and sanitation remains a severe problem in Yemen for all, as it greatly hampers the accessibility of clean water to necessary populations and can result in major health problems. Under-investment in Yemen’s water infrastructure, coupled with Yemen’s water scarcity, resulted in almost 17.8 million Yemenis with shortages of clean water or sanitation facilities. The lack of clean water facilities was also the catalyst for the Yemen cholera outbreak in 2016, where over 2.5 million cases were reported, and 4,000 deaths (International Committee on the Red Cross).

A report by the UNDP sheds more light on the alarming food insecurity situation in Yemen and their challenges in achieving Sustainable Development Goal 2 (Zero Hunger). According to the report, published in 2019, the calories per capita in Yemen was projected to decrease to less than 1800 calories per day, more than 10% less than the FAO’s recommended 2000 calories per day. Furthermore, childhood stunting as a result of malnutrition is a grave problem, as it can result in obstacles to cognitive or physical development of the child. UNICEF reports that 49% of Yemeni children under the age of 5 are at severe risk of stunted growth, and they have also declared plans to attempt to treat 500,000 Yemeni children for acute malnutrition in 2024.



The UNDP's report also makes projections of the food situation in Yemen for 2030, such as the calories per capita reaching a mere 1,500, a 95.5% malnourishment rate in the population and a 79.5% malnourishment rate among children if the conflict were to be protracted until 2030.

However, efforts continue to be hampered by the circumstances in Yemen. Torrential rains and floods in 2024 had resulted in difficulties in providing humanitarian aid, and almost 400,000 people were reported to be displaced by the floods, along with detrimental effects on agriculture and infrastructure in the country. Saudi Arabia's blockade of key ports like Hodeidah also slows down the provision of humanitarian aid, which prevents necessary aid from reaching needy populations in southern Yemen. (Reuters). The challenges that prevent food aid from reaching Yemeni populations must be tackled swiftly in order to prevent further escalations of the conflict.

### **Study 3: The effect of the economic crisis on Yemeni civilians**

The economic crisis in Yemen has had an indirect, yet profound impact on the enjoyment of fundamental rights by the Yemeni people, especially women and children. The collapse of financial and economic systems has devastated families in more than one way, as it directly affects their access to safe water and food, basic necessities, job opportunities and income.

Since the war began, Yemen has faced crippling inflation and threats to their standing in world trade, which threatens their ability to acquire resources required for development and supporting their citizens. The internationally recognised Yemeni government's fiscal revenue has reduced by over 30% from 2022 to 2023, as a result of oil blockades and attacks on official government-owned ports by the Houthis. Oil revenues decreased from making up 4.8% of Yemen's government revenue in 2022, to only 1.6% in 2023. As a result, the official government has had to make significant cuts in government expenditure, from 12.2% of the country's GDP in 2022, to only 10.9% in 2023. As a result, many facilities in the country that are vital for the people are now in shambles, such as healthcare and education.



Almost 3,000 schools have been destroyed, damaged or used for non-educational purposes in Yemen, and as a result, approximately 4.5 million Yemeni children are unable to attend school. Furthermore, the healthcare systems in the official government controlled territory have collapsed due to the war, as approximately 46% of all healthcare facilities are either only partially functional or fully defunct.



In addition, poverty has risen significantly in Yemen, hampering its ability to achieve SDG 1 (No Poverty), where approximately 89% of rural populations and 68% of urban populations live below the poverty line. The MPI, or the Multidimensional Poverty Index, which is a marker of poverty and the deprivations of certain basic necessities that a person faces, was also a major indicator of the depth of poverty, as the MPI of Yemenis rose to 0.386. This would mean that Yemenis were on average deprived of 38.6% of all basic necessities in their life, with an emphasis on education, sanitation, cooking fuel, and water.

Though the UNHRC cannot take direct action on the economy of Yemen, it plays a key role in mitigating the humanitarian fallout of the crisis at hand. The UNHRC must work to ensure that Yemenis are guaranteed access to their fundamental needs for survival, rights to education, food, water, sanitation and healthcare, and ensure that the effects of the economic crisis on civilians are softened till a time when the economy stabilises.



# BLOC positions

The Yemen humanitarian has the world divided on the right way forward. Though the common goal of ending the plight of innocent Yemenis remains, the terms of which are subject to debate in committee.

## **Houthi Bloc**

The bloc supporting the Houthis aims to oust the existing official Yemeni government. They believe that the rightful rulers of Yemen are the Houthi tribe, and as such view the existing government as an obstacle. The Houthis are also opposed to Western ideology and secularism, aiming to impose Shia-Islam ideologies and a strict implementation of Sharia law. They oppose the Saudi blockade of their key ports like Hodeidah, and also oppose outside interference in the affairs of Yemen. The Houthis also believe that the blockade of their ports is detrimental to the flow of humanitarian aid, and believe that the blockade must be lifted to ensure the free flow of humanitarian aid. The Houthis' slogan is "God is great, death to the U.S., death to Israel, curse the Jews, and victory for Islam," which also indicates anti-semitism and anti-American ideologies. They have been declared a violent extremist organisation by the United States, Australia, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and many other countries. Their aim is to establish themselves as the sole rulers of Yemen and strengthen their military and political position in the country. The Houthi's also blame the exacerbation of the crisis on Saudi coalition strikes on Yemen soil, which harms civilians and destroys infrastructure. The Houthi bloc's members would mainly consist of state sponsors of terrorism or other countries that share similar aims, such as Iran (though they formally deny it), North Korea, Syria. They also have links to some non-state actors acting in Yemen, notably al-Qaeda.



## **Saudi-Yemen government Bloc**

The bloc supporting the Saudi coalition aims to re-establish official Yemeni government control over the country. Many members of the coalition have declared the group an extremist organisation, such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and even the coalition's supporters such as the United States. The bloc aims to remove the Houthis from power in Yemen, and wishes to place the official Yemen government back in power in those territories. The bloc is mainly supported by Sunni Muslims, and opposes Shiites. Currently, the Saudi coalition believes that blockades of ports are key to defeating the Houthis, essentially acting as an economic chokehold over their territory. The bloc also mainly aims to bring the Houthis to comply with UNSC Resolution 2216, to cease acts that should fall under the purview of the official Yemen government. As the official Yemeni government is legitimate and recognised internationally, they believe that the Houthis must cease any rule over Yemen, which they believe is rightfully the territory of the official government. The Yemeni government and Saudi coalition bloc's allies would consist of a lot of the Western powers, those who seek to contain Iran's influence in the Middle East and those who oppose extremism, such as the United States, Australia, Bahrain, and the United Kingdom.

Though the bloc shares the common enemy of the Houthis, some disagreements have arisen within the bloc on the topic of the STC. While the UAE instigated the STC's uprising in South Yemen, the legitimate Yemeni government has historically opposed it. Although the Riyadh Agreement, signed by the UAE, the STC and the legitimate government of Yemen, placed STC military forces under the command of the Presidential Leadership Council of the legitimate government of Yemen, an unmistakable rift between the STC and the legitimate government remains.

## **Neutral Bloc**

A neutral bloc is also present in most of the world, and their main aim is to ensure the protection of civilians on all sides and uphold international law. The neutral bloc believes in upholding the past UNSC resolutions regarding Yemen, especially concerning the flow of humanitarian aid, respecting human rights and ending the violence in all parties. They do not necessarily associate themselves with any of the 3 key parties to the Yemen civil war, and wish to find a peaceful and fast end to the conflict, regardless of the terms.



Most neutral bloc countries would have expressed either condemnation of human rights by all parties or simply disassociate themselves with all parties. They aim to specifically try and uphold the Geneva Conventions, relevant human rights treaties (the ICCPR, ICESCR and other such treaties), and de-escalate the conflict. The bloc also advocates for bolstering actions of the OHCHR and holding perpetrators of human rights accountable, without prejudice as to their political affiliations in the conflict. The main goal of the neutral bloc will be to reach a solution that is agreeable upon by all parties, and they serve as a “middle ground” in the committee.



# QARMA

## (Questions A Resolution Must Answer)

1. How can the international community ensure safe and unrestricted humanitarian access to all areas of Yemen, including regions controlled by different parties?
2. What new frameworks and changes to existing frameworks can be implemented to enforce regulations in order to ensure the protection of civilians from violence, displacement, and exploitation during the conflict?
3. How can the UNHRC and member states work to provide immediate assistance to communities suffering from malnutrition and disease outbreaks?
4. What measures can be implemented to rebuild and protect critical infrastructure, such as hospitals, schools, and water systems, in conflict-affected areas?
5. How can international actors ensure the protection and rehabilitation of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees while upholding their human rights?
6. What steps can be taken to safeguard the rights of women and children in Yemen, including the prevention of gender-based violence and child soldier recruitment?
7. How can major stakeholders in the Yemen conflict be held accountable for violations of international humanitarian law and human rights, and how can the UNHRC ensure justice for victims?



8. What role can regional organizations and neighboring states play in supporting peace efforts and mitigating the spillover effects (consequences, inadvertent effects) of the crisis?
9. What policies can improve inclusion and protection of the rights of marginalized communities and ethnic minorities in the future?
9. How can international intervention and diplomatic pressure be used to reduce violence while minimizing harm to civilians?
10. What measures can be taken to ensure that long-term peacebuilding efforts address the root causes of the conflict, such as poverty, inequality, and political exclusion?



# COMMITTEE procedure

## Role Call

The committee begins with roll call. When your country is called, you must respond with either:

- **Present** – This means you are in the room and can abstain during substantive voting.
- **Present and Voting** – This means you are in the room but cannot abstain during substantive voting. You must vote either in favor or against.

## General Speakers List (GSL)

The GSL / opening speeches is the first major part of the session. Each delegate delivers a 90-second opening speech outlining their country's stance on the agenda along with slightly touching upon their ideas for solutions etc. This sets the stage for further debate and showcases key priorities and positions.

## Points

- **Point of Personal Privilege:** Used if a delegate is experiencing discomfort (e.g., can't hear the speaker). (raise your placard and say "point of personal privilege" before asking, and state your point if the chair allows you to do so)
- **Point of Parliamentary Inquiry:** A question regarding rules or procedures. (raise your placard and say "Point of Parliamentary Inquiry" before asking, and state your point if the chair allows you to do so)
- **Point of Information (POI):** A question directed at a speaker after they have concluded their speech. This is subject to the speaker's acceptance. (raise your placard and say "Point of Information" before asking, and state your point if the chair allows you to do so)



## Moderated Caucuses

Moderated caucuses are structured debates focusing on specific subtopics of the broader agenda. Delegates raise their placards to speak for a set time (e.g., 30 seconds). Topics should be narrow, such as “Humanitarian Aid Strategies in Yemen.”

- How to Raise the Motion: “The delegate of [your country] would like to raise a moderated caucus with a per speaker time of \_\_\_\_ and a total speaker time of \_\_\_\_.” (the per speaker time must be mathematically divisible with the total speaker time)

## Unmoderated Caucuses

Unmoderated caucuses are informal discussions where delegates move around the room to negotiate, form alliances, and draft resolutions. These focus on collaboration and drafting documents.

- How to Raise the Motion: “The delegate of [your country] would like to raise an unmoderated caucus for a total time of \_\_\_\_.”

## Other Forms of Debate

- Round Robins: Each delegate speaks in turn. This ensures everyone’s voice is heard.
  - How to Raise the Motion: “The delegate of [your country] would like to raise a round robin with a per speaker time of \_\_\_\_ and a total speaker time of \_\_\_\_.”
- Open Floor: In the given time period, the EB can tap on anybody’s desk and they must speak until another speaker has been picked by the EB.
  - How to Raise the Motion: “The delegate of [your country] would like to open the floor for debate, a total time of \_\_\_\_.”



- **3v3 or 2v2 Debates:** A structured debate between two teams representing opposing viewpoints. This format allows for deeper engagement on contentious issues.
  - **How to Raise the Motion:** "The delegate of [your country] would like to raise a 3v3 (or 2v2) debate, with a per speaker time of \_\_\_ and a total speaker time of \_\_\_ with the delegates of [names of countries who have agreed to partake in the debate]"

**Important Note:** This guide is for your reference, but we will be holding training sessions where you can ask questions and review this information. If you have any urgent questions or need clarification, feel free to email or message any one of us.



# OTHER SOURCES FOR research

It is vital that all delegates are thoroughly researched- try your best even if it's your first time! As your EB, we expect concrete points, substantiated arguments and quality research. While we have put our utmost effort into providing a holistic view of most aspects of the agenda through the study guide, please note that it is only a starting point to your research. A few tips to extend your research further:

- When reading the study guide, note down key information as well as any questions you have stemming from the information in the guide. Use these as a starting point for your extended research.
- Ensure that you have a well-rounded understanding on your country's stance, as well as some general information regarding them (head of state, flag, largest exports/imports, state of your economy, type of government etc). Identify your potential allies and enemies in committee based on their differing or similar view points in comparison to your nation's.
- Create a dirt sheet – have a few pointers/facts against your enemies and in order to support your allies. This will be helpful during POIs, as well as for your own understanding of the agenda and the dynamics within it.

Please make sure that you note down your sources to back up anything you say in committee and are prepared in case you are questioned.



When researching, it is important to keep in mind what kind of sources you are using. A possible way to determine how credible a source is, is to use the OPVL or CRAAP testing methods to check how reliable they are or just analyse how trustworthy the source is, does it have a reputation for speaking fake news? Does it have a visible bias? Etc. It is strongly advisable to use reputable and reliable sources throughout your research. Here are a few we recommend:

- UN, UNHRC & OHCHR sources (articles, reports)
- Official Govt. websites and govt. Reports (state-operated sources)
- Reuters, Amnesty International, Bloomberg, Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), CIA World Factbook (for country profiles), Al Jazeera (Al Jazeera is completely funded by the Qatari government), BBC (British Broadcasting Company), Minority Rights Group, The Guardian, The New York Times



# CONCLUDING remarks

Dear Delegates,

As we come to the end of this UNHRC committee Study Guide on “Addressing the humanitarian crisis stemming from the Yemeni civil war” we want to express our gratitude for your willingness to address this critical issue and actively take part in the upcoming discussions. We, your Executive Board, have carefully crafted this guide to assist you as a pathway to understanding this agenda, and hope you use it to encourage and begin fruitful debate in committee. This study guide should only serve as a start to your research, since we strongly recommend that you go above and beyond the aforementioned pointers.

During this conference, we look forward to seeing fiery opening speeches (GSLs), engaging moderated caucuses, productive discussions, and passionate debates throughout the time in committee. Ultimately, we hope to see thoughtful resolutions that address the multi-faceted challenges of the Yemeni humanitarian crisis, while upholding the values of the UNHRC.

As your Executive Board, we are excited to see you apply your skills in this committee and engage in meaningful discussions as you take on the role of a delegate, and learn from you all too! We hope this conference proves to be a valuable learning experience and helps you grow your passion for MUN and international diplomacy.

Please feel free to contact us with any questions or concerns you may have, good luck.

Your Executive Board,  
Aanya Baxi, Naavya Dhanuka & Vihaan SM.



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